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Strategies for implementing the new International Health 
Regulations in federal countries
Kumanan Wilson,a Christopher McDougall,b David P Fidler c & Harvey Lazar d
Abstract The International Health Regulations (IHR), the principal legal instrument guiding the international management of public 
health emergencies, have recently undergone an extensive revision process. The revised regulations, referred to as the IHR (2005), 
were unanimously approved in May 2005 by all Member States of the World Health Assembly (WHA) and came into effect on 15 June 
2007. The IHR (2005) reflect a modernization of the international community’s approach to public health and an acknowledgement of 
the importance of establishing an effective international strategy to manage emergencies that threaten global health security.
The success of the IHR as a new approach to combating such threats will ultimately be determined by the ability of countries to 
live up to the obligations they assumed in approving the new international strategy. However, doing so may be particularly challenging 
for decentralized countries, specifically those with federal systems of government. Although the IHR (2005) are the product of an 
agreement among national governments, they cover a wide range of matters, some of which may not fall fully under the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the national government within many federations. This tension between the separation of powers within federal systems 
of government and the requirements of an evolving global public health governance regime may undermine national efforts towards 
compliance and could ultimately jeopardize the regime’s success.
We hosted a workshop to examine how federal countries could address some of the challenges they may face in implementing 
the IHR (2005). We present here a series of recommendations, synthesized from the workshop proceedings, on strategies that these 
countries might pursue to improve their ability to comply with the revised IHR.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2008;86:215–220.
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The revised International Health Regu-
lations (IHR) represent a dramatic new 
approach to combating public health 
emergencies.1 However, the success of the 
IHR may be impeded because of prob-
lems federal countries may experience in 
meeting their requirements.2,3 Founded 
on a series of sanitary conventions dat-
ing back to the mid 19th century, the 
recently revised IHR aim to guide the 
response of Member States to public 
health emergencies, with a particular 
focus on preventing the international 
spread of disease without unnecessary 
disruption of trade or travel. Recogni-
tion of the limitations of previous ver-
sions, as well as growing awareness of 
the increased threat of infectious dis-
eases in an ever-more interconnected 
world, prompted an extensive revision 
process which began in 1995 and con-
cluded with unanimous approval of the 
new agreement in May 2005.4,5
The IHR (2005) reflect a substan-
tial change in approach to international 
health governance, with the protection 
of the international community from 
public health threats granted priority 
over national sovereignty in certain 
circumstances.6 Some of the more dra-
matic examples of this shift in approach 
include: new requirements for coun-
tries to report on potential public health 
emergencies within 24 hours; WHO au-
thority to use nongovernmental sources 
of information for surveillance pur-
poses; and the ability of WHO to issue 
public health recommendations such as 
those regarding travel, with or without 
the consent of potentially affected States 
Parties.1–3 A further major innovation 
in the new IHR is the detailed re-
quirement for States Parties to develop 
multilevel capacities (referred to as core 
capacity requirements) to effectively 
manage public health threats (Table 1). 
The revised IHR impose on all WHO 
Member States the explicit obligation to 
develop, strengthen, and maintain the 
capacity to detect, report and respond 
to public health events.7 When com-
bined, the required capacities constitute 
a blueprint for a comprehensive, fully-
integrated, public health emergency 
detection and response system.
The IHR outline “core capacity 
requirements for designated airports, 
ports and ground crossings”. These re-
quirements should not be problematic 
for most federal countries to implement 
since international points of entry 
normally fall under the jurisdiction of 
national governments. Potential com-
pliance problems, however, can emerge 
with regard to those core capacities 
over which federal governments may 
not have explicit jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, surveillance powers may fall to 
the regional (such as state, provincial 
or cantonal) level of government in 
many federal countries. Federal gov-
ernments may not have the authority 
to implement local level surveillance 
or guarantee the transfer of epidemio-
logical data from local to national levels 
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to meet IHR (2005) requirements. 
Compounding matters is the fact that 
voluntary compliance from the local 
level cannot be presumed due to re-
source limitations at this level or fear of 
economic consequences related to early 
reporting of potential emergencies.
The potential difficulty in reconcil-
ing federal systems of government with 
the IHR (2005) is illustrated by a 
request made by the United States of 
America for an article declaring that it 
would implement the regulations in 
a manner that is most consistent with 
its federal system of government.8 The 
rejection of the USA’s request suggests 
that other federal countries did not view 
their systems of government as an insur-
mountable obstacle to implementation 
of the IHR (2005).9 To the contrary, 
the unanimous approval of the IHR 
(2005) by all members of the World 
Health Assembly, including its fed-
eral countries, is evidence of a global 
recognition of the importance of the 
agreement as well as of the general will-
ingness of States Parties to take measures 
to overcome domestic obstacles to its 
implementation.
Implementation in federal 
countries
Addressing the domestic governance 
challenges created by an increasingly 
demanding global public health regime 
is not a simple task. While all countries 
share an interest in addressing global 
public health emergencies through the 
revised IHR, they differ in important 
ways that will have an impact on the 
viability of various strategies to imple-
ment the agreement. Every country has 
a unique governance system, as well as 
a legal framework (constitutional or 
otherwise) that places limitations on 
the design of policies and practices. 
Countries also have unique histories, 
including experiences with public 
health emergencies and acceptance of 
national government intervention. In 
some federal countries, India for ex-
ample, it may be considered more ac-
ceptable for national governments to 
intervene in local issues, particularly if 
that intervention brings much needed 
resources to manage public health 
threats.
No one set of policy options will 
be appropriate for all federations. To 
Table 1. Core capacities for surveillance and response
Obligations of States 
Parties to IHR (2005)
Local level Intermediate level National level
Core capacities •  to detect unusual public health 
events
•  to report key epidemiological 
information to relevant 
intermediate and national 
authorities
•  to immediately implement 
primary control measures
•  to evaluate and verify 
epidemiological data
•  to implement additional control 
measures as necessary
•  to report to national authorities
•  to assess within 48 h all domestic 
“urgent events” by consolidating input 
from and disseminating information to 
relevant sectors of the administration
•  to report the results of assessments as 
required within 24 h to WHO through 
a national focal point (NFP) which 
must be accessible at all times for 
communications
Points of entry  
capacities
•  to provide and maintain facilities and expertise to conduct inspection (of goods and conveyances) and interview, 
diagnosis and treatment (of travellers) at designated points of entry
Cross-cutting  
capacities
•  to conduct 24 h/7 day surveillance and inspection, reporting, notification, verification, response, and collaboration 
with domestic and international public health authorities
•  to develop and maintain trained specialized personnel and facilities for health data collection, laboratory investigation 
and operational/logistical support (including communication, transportation and supply chain), and detailed national 
public health emergency plans that specify multi-sectoral response teams
•  to implement the regulations and conduct of public health interventions “with full respect for the dignity, human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons” (and as guided by the UN Charter and WHO Constitution)
•  to assess existing national capacities to comply with the terms of the IHR (2005) within 2 years (and to achieve full 
compliance within 5 years) of the entry into force of the agreement
Capacity-building in  
low-resource countries
•  for WHO and State Parties to assist in the development of public health capacities everywhere, including the 
provision of technical cooperation and logistical support, as well as the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate 
implementation of the IHR
IHR, International Health Regulations; PHEIC, public health emergencies of international concern.
determine the appropriate approach for 
federal countries, the following funda-
mental questions need to be answered: 
(1) To what extent can federal countries 
ensure compliance with the IHR within 
the context of a decentralized approach 
to public health?  (2) If federal countries 
adopt more centralized approaches to 
public health, how should they manage 
the potential negative impacts of such 
reforms on their relationships with 
regional and local public health authori-
ties?  (3) In either case, how coercive are 
federal governments justified in being 
towards regional governments to ensure 
that the coordination of public health 
necessary for compliance with the IHR 
takes place?
Governance options
To effectively implement the IHR, federal 
governments will need to take steps to 
either centralize governance, or at the 
minimum, increase harmonization of 
public health policy and practice at the 
level of regional government. The latter 
will require creating a structure whereby 
regional governments are encouraged to 
develop the appropriate local public health 
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capacity and pass necessary public health 
legislation that will allow the country to 
meet IHR requirements. Federal govern-
ments have different instruments they 
can utilize to achieve these goals. These 
include direct legislation within the area of 
public health, legislation within a parallel 
area that covers the matters of interest, 
funding arrangements, the use of intergov-
ernmental agreements, and the issuance 
of national guidelines. Each of these has 
advantages and disadvantages and it is im-
portant to identify the combination of in-
struments that can optimize the likelihood 
of successful compliance with the IHR 
while mitigating its potential harms 
(Box 1).
Legislation
Among the options available to federal 
governments, the legislative approach is 
likely to be considered one of the most 
intrusive, or least respectful, of regional 
sovereignty. But it may also be one of 
the most effective mechanisms for the 
implementation of the IHR (2005). 
The ability of a national or federal gov-
ernment to exploit this option will in 
many cases depend on the allocation 
of powers in the constitution. If the 
federal government has clear constitu-
tional jurisdiction, it could pass legisla-
tion imposing requirements on local or 
regional public health authorities. This 
legislation could provide for surveillance 
capacity development at the regional 
level, compulsory reporting of public 
health threats and allow for federal in-
tervention in public health emergencies. 
The IHR (2005) decision instrument 
for identifying a public health emer-
gency of international concern (PHEIC) 
could be adopted as a federal test for 
jurisdiction for the latter issue: if a pub-
lic health emergency is found to be of 
international concern according to the 
algorithm contained in the instrument, 
then the federal government would au-
tomatically have jurisdiction over the 
matter. India, for example, has proposed 
new legislation that explicitly provides 
the federal government with authority 
over a WHO-declared PHEIC.
The constitutions of many coun-
tries, however, are silent on the alloca-
tion of public health powers between 
levels of government, with the result in 
most cases being concurrent jurisdic-
tional authority for activities related to 
the IHR. On the other hand, parallel 
constitutional powers often provide 
mechanisms through which federal gov-
ernments can gain the needed legisla-
tive authority. In Canada, for example, 
the criminal law power has been used 
by the federal government to regulate 
in public health.10 In the USA, the 
federal government’s tax and spending 
powers and its ability to regulate in-
terstate commerce provide the oppor-
tunity to extend its influence in many 
public health matters.11 The constitu-
tions of some federal countries also con-
tain variations of a “supremacy clause” 
whereby conflicts between regional and 
federal legislation (including treaty law) 
are resolved in favour of federal law.12
The use of these alternative ap-
proaches must be considered with par-
ticular caution. The expansion of fed-
eral authority into an area not other-
wise constitutionally enumerated runs 
the risk of being viewed as a power 
grab, and could damage essential col-
laborative intergovernmental relation-
ships. Moreover, unilateral assertions of 
federal authority, whatever the legal 
grounds, are unlikely to be effective in 
the absence of regional cooperation, 
and could, in the worst case, generate 
animosity sufficient to seriously im-
pair responses during a public health 
emergency.13 Thus such measures and 
approaches should only be considered 
once other less intrusive alternatives 
have failed, and only when a federal 
government judges that its lack of legis-
lative authority poses a significant threat 
to its citizens or to the international 
community.
An intriguing and controversial 
approach to establishing a legislative 
basis for federal authority to intervene 
during public health emergencies is 
through the use of security powers. This 
is an option that has been considered by 
the United States and Australia, which 
has recently enacted legislation that 
links public health surveillance with 
national security.14,15
The securitization of public health 
has implications that need to be care-
fully considered.16–18 A primary ad-
vantage is that it could provide the 
federal government with the necessary 
powers to take aggressive action early 
in a public health emergency. Including 
public health as an essential component 
of security also raises the profile and 
visibility of the former, which may in 
turn result in increased resources for 
population health. However, securitiza-
tion is in direct opposition to the funda-
mental ethos of public health based on 
collaboration. It also necessarily makes 
public health concerns secondary to 
security concerns, and so public health 
emergencies could ultimately fall under 
the authority of security officials as op-
posed to public health officials.
Importantly, the consideration of 
any legislative approach must also respect 
other aspects of a nation’s constitution, 
notably human rights provisions. Respect 
for human rights is also explicitly made 
Box 1. Key messages from symposium
Participants in the symposium included senior public health experts from, but not officially 
representing, the following: Australia, Canada, China, France (China and France are examples 
of decentralized unitary countries), India, the Russia Federation, Senegal (as a general 
representative of regional governance in Africa), the United States of America and WHO. 
The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of 
WHO or participating countries.
Each of the countries involved had uniquely different experiences with implementing the 
International Health Regulations (IHR). Australia, Canada and the USA were confronted with the 
challenge that authority over several of the core capacity requirements was primarily located 
at the state or province level. Each of these countries has potential mechanisms by which 
these powers could be centralized, although such a process may be contrary to the history of 
federalism within that country and could be viewed as harmful to the integrity of the public health 
system. 
The intention of these countries is to manage these issues through collaborative approaches 
such as harmonization of legislation, funding arrangements and memoranda of understanding. 
Brazil, India and the Russian Federation have systems in which necessary legislative authority 
exists at the federal level and regional governments are dependent on central governments 
for funding, which allows conditions to be attached to funding. These countries have more 
governance mechanisms by which to implement the IHR although public health capacity at the 
local or regional level remains a critical issue. The representative from Senegal identified the 
need for coordination of governance not just within each country but also with adjacent countries 
with which borders are often crossed in daily activities and from which diseases could spread.
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obligatory under the IHR (2005), which 
requires that domestic implementation be 
guided by the UN Charter, the WHO 
Constitution, and “with full respect for 
the dignity, human rights, and funda-
mental freedoms of persons”.19
Funding power
Ultimately legislative authority at the 
federal level is meaningless without 
necessary capacity at the regional or local 
levels. Moreover, strengthening public 
health capacity to meet the require-
ments of the IHR (2005) will require 
significant resource commitments in 
most countries. One way to achieve 
enhanced capacity, while ensuring that 
local and regional authorities transfer 
relevant public health information to 
national governments, is through con-
ditional funding arrangements. These 
would most likely involve agreements 
between federal and local or regional 
governments to share the costs of de-
veloping surveillance infrastructure in 
exchange for guaranteed transfer of 
epidemiological information to the na-
tional level. From a political perspective, 
such an arrangement may be viewed as 
less intrusive than a legislative approach. 
It also has the potential to achieve the 
same or better results on the ground, 
particularly when there is a large finan-
cial asymmetry between national and 
regional governments. However, some 
regional governments may still regard 
the attachment of conditions to federal 
dollars as coercive and could potentially 
restrict the optimal use of these dollars 
at the local level. This is particularly true 
in developing countries dealing with 
the burden of multiple public health 
threats, such as HIV, tuberculosis and 
malaria, which they are already insuffi-
ciently resourced to manage.
Intergovernmental agreements
Another less intrusive option than legisla-
tion is the creation of formal negotiated 
agreements between different levels of 
governments. These would be mutually 
agreed upon and would therefore respect 
jurisdictional boundaries. Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOU) could be par-
ticularly effective for issues such as data 
transfer and could be used to formalize 
funding arrangements. They might also 
establish the level of authority the federal 
government would have in the event of a 
regional public health emergency of pos-
sible national or international concern. 
Canadian federal and provincial authori-
ties have been considering the use of an 
MOU related to data transfer, based on 
the PHEIC algorithm proposed in the 
decision-making instrument in Annex 2 
of the IHR (2005). Australia has devel-
oped an intergovernmental agreement 
to outline the mechanism by which an 
emergency will be declared.20 However, 
in the absence of additional funding ar-
rangements or compensation plans, such 
agreements could be difficult to enforce. 
Tensions are likely to arise when regional 
governments are faced with the actual 
decision to report a public health emer-
gency which could risk damage to the 
local economy. One approach to diffusing 
such tensions would be to pursue inter-
governmental agreements for the creation 
of independent bodies to oversee public 
health activities (during emergencies and 
otherwise) that could act at arms’ length 
of government. The degree of autonomy 
of such organizations will be dependent 
upon the legislative framework within 
which they must operate as well as the 
source of their funding.
National guidelines
Another minimally intrusive approach 
is the creation of national guidelines 
with regard, for example, to the stan-
dardization of data collection, storage 
and reporting. Regional and national 
data standardization remains a major 
obstacle in most countries, where there 
is a need to develop compatible, if not 
fully-integrated, information technol-
ogy platforms for the collection, analy-
sis and communication of information 
during a public health emergency. 
Guidelines, while not binding, could be 
used to encourage such harmonization 
and could lead to increased coopera-
tion from local governments if they are 
invited to participate in the process of 
guideline formulation. Another ad-
vantage of guidelines, as compared to 
legislation, is that they can be rapidly 
modified to remain current with chang-
ing technologies and evolving public 
health science and practice. Guidelines 
are most likely to be effective if used in 
combination with another strategy, in 
particular conditional funding arrange-
ments. For example, the Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act in the 
USA provides an example of how 
federal funding to states can be made 
contingent on meeting federal stan-
dards.21
Conclusion
We have presented several governance 
strategies that federal countries could 
consider when determining how to 
comply with the revised IHR (summary 
in Table 2). Our recommendations are 
intended for federal governments but 
may also be useful for decentralized 
countries with unitary systems of gov-
ernment. While in these countries the 
central government always has a legisla-
tive option, the importance of maintain-
ing effective collaborative relationships 
should encourage the consideration of 
other approaches.
There is no single solution to the 
challenges faced by federal States Parties 
to the revised IHR. In all likelihood, 
a combination of strategies based on 
specific circumstances will have to be 
developed for each country. However, a 
couple of  over-arching themes emerged 
from the proceedings of our workshop. 
First, we expect the greatest challenges 
to occur in meeting the surveillance, 
reporting and response requirements of 
the IHR. The revised IHR require that 
a single body within every country has 
the responsibility to communicate to 
WHO about potential PHEIC. Assum-
ing this will be a federal agency, the most 
effective mechanism by which to ensure 
it has the required information would 
be to incorporate the Annex 2 decision 
instrument either into legislation or an 
MOU between federal and regional 
governments. If and when a potential 
PHEIC is detected, the federal agency 
must possess sufficient authority to as-
sess and acquire all available pertinent 
information so as to meet the IHR 
reporting requirements. Second, ongo-
ing challenges such as surveillance at the 
local level are likely to be handled better 
through more collaborative approaches 
that combine conditional funding to 
develop capacity with intergovernmental 
agreements to formalize relationships 
and responsibilities. National guidelines 
could be used for matters in which stan-
dardization of practices is sought.
Whatever the combination of strat-
egies used, their ultimate success will 
depend crucially on the development 
of appropriate public health capacity 
at all levels of government, as well as 
effective working relationships between 
the various stakeholders. Furthermore, 
devolution of public health activities 
or powers to nongovernmental entities, 
for example in the form of privatization, 
can make agreements between govern-
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ments meaningless and threatens to 
undermine compliance with the IHR 
by limiting the ability of countries to 
gather and aggregate public health 
information.22,23 Any implementation 
strategy that does not take these factors 
into serious consideration is likely to 
be ineffective in promoting compliance 
with the IHR (2005).  ■
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Résumé
Stratégies de mise en œuvre du nouveau règlement sanitaire international dans les Etats fédéraux
Le Règlement sanitaire international (RSI), principal instrument 
juridique guidant la prise en charge internationale des urgences 
de santé publique, a récemment fait l’objet d’un processus de 
révision approfondi. Le règlement révisé, appelé RSI (2005), a été 
approuvé à l’unanimité en mai 2005 par tous les Etats Membres 
de l’Assemblée mondiale de la Santé (WHA), puis est entré en 
vigueur le 15 juin 2007. Le RSI (2005) reflète la modernisation de 
l’approche de la santé publique par la communauté internationale 
et la reconnaissance de l’importance d’une stratégie internationale 
efficace pour faire face aux situations d’urgence qui menacent la 
sécurité sanitaire mondiale.
Le succès du RSI, en tant que nouvelle approche pour 
combattre ces menaces, sera conditionné en dernier ressort par 
la capacité des pays à s’acquitter des obligations auxquelles ils 
se sont soumis en approuvant la nouvelle stratégie internationale. 
Néanmoins, respecter ces obligations risque d’être particulièrement 
difficile pour les pays décentralisés, notamment ceux dotés d’un 
système fédéral de gouvernement. Si le RSI (2005) est le fruit 
d’un accord entre gouvernements nationaux, il couvre une grande 
variété de questions, dont certaines ne relèvent pas totalement 
du gouvernement national dans nombre de fédérations. Cette 
tension entre la séparation des pouvoirs au sein des systèmes 
de gouvernement fédéraux et les exigences d’un régime de 
gouvernance sanitaire mondiale en évolution pourrait saper 
les efforts au niveau national pour respecter le règlement et 
finalement remettre en cause le succès de cette gouvernance.
Nous avons accueilli un atelier chargé d’examiner comment 
les Etats fédéraux pourraient répondre à certaines de difficultés 
qu’ils risquent de rencontrer dans l’application du RSI (2005). 
Nous présentons dans cet article une série de recommandations, 
formulées à partir des actes de l’atelier, sur les stratégies que 
pourraient suivre ces pays pour améliorer leur capacité à respecter 
le RSI révisé.
Resumen
Estrategias para aplicar el nuevo Reglamento Sanitario Internacional en los países federales
El Reglamento Sanitario Internacional (RSI), que constituye el 
principal instrumento jurídico disponible para dirigir la gestión 
internacional de las emergencias de salud pública, ha sido 
objeto recientemente de un extenso proceso de revisión. El 
Reglamento revisado, conocido como RSI (2005), fue aprobado 
por unanimidad en mayo de 2005 por todos los Estados Miembros 
de la Asamblea Mundial de la Salud y entró en vigor el 15 de 
junio de 2007. El RSI (2005) refleja el enfoque más moderno que 
aplica a la salud pública la comunidad internacional, así como el 
reconocimiento de la importancia que reviste el establecimiento 
de una estrategia internacional eficaz para controlar las 
emergencias que amenazan la seguridad sanitaria mundial.
Table 2. Summary of governance strategies
Governance 
strategies
Advantages Disadvantages Potential area of use
Legislation •  enforceable 
•  clear designation of roles and 
responsibilities
•  clear lines of accountability
•  dependent on existence of 
appropriate constitutional authority
•  may damage relations with other 
levels of government
•  inflexible
•  authority to oversee and guide 
response to a PHEIC
•  mechanism to ensure transfer of 
epidemiological data to national level
Funding 
arrangements
•  enforceable
•  links capacity development to 
governance strategy
•  respects constitutional boundaries
•  may be changed unilaterally by 
national government
•  may be viewed as coercive
•  creates some ambiguity as to 
accountability
•  surveillance capacity development 
in combination with meeting IHR 
reporting requirements
Agreements •  respects constitutional boundaries •  limits to enforceability •  mechanism to ensure transfer of 
epidemiological data to national level
Guidelines •  respects constitutional boundaries
•  flexible
•  least enforceable •  standardization of data
IHR, International Health Regulations; PHEIC, public health emergencies of international concern.
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صخلم
ةيلارديفلا نادلبلا في ةيلودلا ةيحصلا حئاوللا ذيفنت تايجيتارـتسا
 ةرادلإا اهب دشترست يتلا ةيساسلأا ةينوناقلا ةادلأا ةيلودلا ةيحصلا حئاوللا دعت
 هذه  ًارخؤم  تعضخ دقو  ،ةيمومعلا  ةحصلا  ددهتت  يتلا  ئراوطلل  ةيلودلا
 حئاوللاب فرعت ةحقنلما حئاوللا تحبصأو ،ةلماش ةعجارم ةيلمع لىإ حئاوللا
 في ءاضعلأا لودلا عيمج ةقفاوم لىع تزاح دقو ،)2005( ةيلودلا ةيحصلا
 زيح تلخدو ،2005 ويام/رايأ رهش في ءانثتسا نودب ةيلماعلا ةحصلا ةيعمج
 ةيصرعلا تماسلا سكعت يهو ،2007 ماع نم وينوي/ناريزح 15 في ذيفنتلا
 هفارـتعا  عم  ةيمومعلا  ةحصلا  في  ليودلا  عمتجلما  هجهتني  يذلا  بولسلأل
 نملأا  ددهت  يتلا  ئراوطلا  ةرادلإ  ةلاعف  ةيلود  ةيجيتارـتسا  ديطوت  ةيمهأب
.يلماعلا ديعصلا لىع يحصلا
 هذه لثم ةهجاوم في ديدج بولسأك ةيلودلا ةيحصلا حئاوللا حاجن نإ
 يتلا  تامازتللااب  ءافولا  لىع  نادلبلا  ةردقم  هددحتس  رمأ  وه  تاديدهتلا
 لاإ  ،ةديدجلا  ةيلودلا  ةيجيتارـتسلاا  لىع اهتقفاوم  ىدل  اهسفن  لىع  اهتعطق
 مايسلاو ،ةيزكرلما نع ةديعبلا نادلبلل ًايدحت هتاذ دحب نوكيس كلذ ذيفنت نأ
 ةيلودلا ةيحصلا حئاوللا نأ مغرف .ةيلارديفلا ةيموكحلا مُظُنلا تاذ نادلبلا
 نم ًاعساو ًافيط يطغت اهنإف ،ةينطولا تاموكحلا ينب قافتلاا جاتن يه 2005
 ةينطولا تاموكحلل ةيروتسدلا تاعيشرتلا تحت جردني لا دق اهضعب ،اياضقلا
 نمض ىوقلا لاصفنا ينب رتوتلا اذه يدؤي دقو .تايلارديفلا نم يرثكلا نمض
 ةحصلا في ةماكحلل ةدجتسلما مُظُنلا هبلطتت امو ةموكحلل ةيلارديفلا مُظُنلا
 حئاولل  لاثتملاا  لىا  ةيمارلا  ةينطولا  دوهجلا  فاعضإ  لىإ  ةيلماعلا  ةيمومعلا
.اهماظن حاجن لياتلاب ددهت دقو  ةيلودلا ةيحصلا
 فيك ةساردل  ةيلمع ةقلح ةساردلا  هذه لىع نوئماقلا  فاضتسا  دقو
 ذيفنت في اههجاوت دق يتلا تايدحتلا ضعب ةهجاوم ةيلارديفلا نادلبلل نكيم
 نم  ةلسلس  ةلاقلما  هذه  في  نوضرعيو  ،2005  ةيلودلا  ةيحصلا  حئاوللا
 يتلا تايجيتارـتسلاا لوح ةيلمعلا ةقلحلا عئاقو نم تعمج يتلا تايصوتلا
 ةيلودلا ةيحصلا حئاولل لاثتملاا لىع اهتردق ينسحتل نادلبلا هذه اهعبتت دق
.ةح َّقنلما
El éxito del RSI como una nueva perspectiva para combatir 
esas amenazas dependerá en último término de la capacidad 
de los países para cumplir las obligaciones que asumieron al 
aprobar la nueva estrategia internacional. Sin embargo, ello 
puede representar una tarea especialmente ardua para los países 
descentralizados, sobre todo para los que cuentan con sistemas 
federales de gobierno. Aunque es fruto de un acuerdo entre 
gobiernos nacionales, el RSI (2005) abarca una amplia gama de 
asuntos que pueden quedar fuera de la jurisdicción constitucional 
del gobierno nacional en muchas federaciones. Ese conflicto entre 
la separación de poderes que se da en los sistemas federales de 
gobierno y las exigencias de las nuevas formas de gobernanza de 
la salud pública mundial puede minar los esfuerzos nacionales 
encaminados a garantizar el cumplimiento de las medidas 
propuestas y a la larga podría poner en peligro el éxito de esas 
medidas.
Organizamos un taller para estudiar de qué manera podrían 
los países federales afrontar algunos de los desafíos que puede 
plantear la aplicación del RSI (2005). Presentamos aquí una serie de 
recomendaciones, sintetizadas a partir de lo discutido en el taller, sobre 
las estrategias que podrían adoptar esos países a fin de mejorar su 
capacidad para cumplir lo dispuesto en el RSI revisado.
